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Germany’s Brake on European Capital Market Development 
 
John Grahl and Photis Lysandrou 
Abstract 
In February, 2015, the European Commission published a Green Paper in which it put 
forward the goal to “build a true single market for capital” for all EU member states by 2019. 
This paper argues that there is no realistic prospect of achieving this goal given that the Green 
Paper omits any reference to a formidable impediment blocking a European capital market 
union: the German government’s stance on debt. The inescapable fact is that this 
government’s reluctance to increase the supply of its bonds is depriving the European capital 
market of one of the essential ingredients necessary to its enlargement on the one hand and to 
the efficiency of its operation on the other: the former because capital market enlargement 
crucially depends  on attracting institutional investors who must hold a substantial proportion 
of their bond portfolios in the form of safe government bonds; the latter because the efficient 
functioning of the capital markets crucially depends on the efficiency of the money markets 
where safe government bonds are by far the most important form of collateral. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In February, 2015, the European Commission published a Green Paper in which it put 
forward the goal to “build a true single market for capital” for all 28 EU member states by 
20191. The rationale behind this ambitious project is clear: only a unified and enlarged 
European capital market can provide extra sources of finance on the scale and on the terms 
needed to boost investment and pull Europe out of its post-crisis recession. What is less clear 
is whether the project is feasible, for the Commission hopes to achieve in under five years 
what has not been achieved in over five decades of ongoing European economic integration. 
The problem is that while the objective may be praiseworthy there is no realistic prospect of 
achieving it by the means proposed given that the Green Paper omits any reference to the 
most formidable of all impediments blocking the creation of a true single European capital 
market: namely, the German government’s stance both on its own debt and on any possible 
issues of debt at EU level 
 
Despite the fact that the nominal yield on its bonds has steadily fallen since the financial 
crisis to the point where it is now hovering around the zero mark, the German government 
has steadfastly refused to take advantage of this development to increase its expenditures in 
any growth generating projects. This refusal, enshrined in its 2009 Basic Law on debt brakes, 
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has understandably come under heavy criticism from a wide variety of quarters including the 
IMF2. However, while much attention has been given to the inhibiting effects on real sector 
growth caused by the German government’s tight fiscal stance, considerably less attention 
has been given to the equally inhibiting effects of this same stance on European capital 
market development. This is possibly one explanation of why the Commission makes no 
mention of the German governments’ fiscal policy in its Green Paper. Another factor may be 
that the Commission does not think it politically judicious to confront the German 
government on an issue that the latter finds highly sensitive. A further explanation is that the 
Commission broadly agrees with the rationale behind debt brakes as shown in its willingness 
to coordinate the implementation of debt brakes across the European Union as agreed in the 
Fiscal Compact of 20123. Whatever the explanation, the inescapable fact is that the German 
government’s reluctance to increase the supply of its bonds is depriving the European capital 
market of one of the essential ingredients necessary to its enlargement on the one hand and to 
the efficiency of its operation on the other: the former because capital market enlargement 
crucially depends  on attracting institutional investors such as pension funds and insurance 
companies who for various reasons have to hold a substantial proportion of their bond 
portfolios in the form of safe government bonds; the latter because the efficient functioning 
of the long term capital markets crucially depends on the efficiency of the short-term money 
markets where safe government bonds are by far the most important form of collateral. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section two briefly outlines the importance of high 
rated government bonds in the capital and money markets. Section three spells out the 
consequences of Germany’s debt brake policy for the European long term capital markets. 
Section four spells out the consequences of this policy for the European short term money 
markets. Section five concludes.   
 
2. Government bonds in the capital and money markets         
The rationale behind the Commission’s plan to build a genuinely integrated and enlarged 
European capital market union by 2019 is sound enough: better integrated capital markets 
would, as the Commission says, “enhance the shock absorbing capacity of the European 
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economy” (2015, p.4) by making it less heavily reliant on banks and thus less vulnerable to a 
tightening of bank lending. In elaborating on this rationale, the Commission argues that the 
development of Europe’s bond markets is a particularly important priority in that it can help 
reduce the burden on Europe’s commercial banks both in a direct sense insofar as more 
businesses can be encouraged to turn to bond issuance for their financing needs and in an 
indirect sense insofar as an increased proportion of bank loans to small businesses and 
households can be taken off banks’ balance sheets and securitised. This argument is 
absolutely correct but, just because this is the case, it is all the more absurd that the 
Commission’s Green Paper makes no reference to sovereign bonds, for the reality is that 
there cannot be any expansion of the European bond markets without a corresponding 
expansion in the supply of bonds issued by credit worthy European governments. There are 
basically two reasons for this.  
The first is that the large institutions that dominate the buy side of the bond markets, namely 
commercial banks on the one hand and asset managers such as pension funds and insurance 
companies on the other, need to hold a substantial proportion of their bond portfolios in the 
form of government bonds to meet regulatory, prudential and liquidity requirements. While 
government bonds share in common with corporate bonds the fact that the payment of 
interest is legally binding in contrast to the payment of dividends on equities which is 
discretionary, they nevertheless differ from corporate bonds in essential respects: government 
bonds typically represent the safest form of investable asset because governments have the 
power of taxation and confiscation; this same power means that government bonds are also 
the archetypal  ‘information-insensitive’ assets, that is, assets which are immune to adverse 
selection in trading because agents have no need to acquire private information about the 
current health of the issuer; finally, the sheer depth of the markets for government bonds 
means that these typically represent the most liquid type of assets (i.e. assets that can be 
traded in substantial volumes while causing minimal price impact). These distinguishing 
characteristics of government bonds explain why they are generally used as the benchmarks 
against which all other bonds are priced, why they are the dominant constituents in the bond 
market indexes that are widely used by institutional investors for bond portfolio management 
purposes, and why, as we say, commercial banks and asset managers are required to hold 
substantial amounts of these bonds in their portfolios. 
   
The second reason for the importance of government bonds to the capital markets is the role 
they play in the short term money markets. Large, deep and liquid capital markets can only 
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exist with the aid of various support services, and these services can in turn only be provided 
on the scale and with the efficiency required if brokers, dealers and other financial 
institutions are able to borrow and lend cash and securities in whatever volumes and with 
whatever frequencies are necessary. While a minority of these borrowing and lending 
transactions (overnight inter-bank transactions being the most typical) takes an unsecured 
form, the great majority involve the use of collateral in order to minimise counter-party risk. 
This much is acknowledged by the Commission for as it states in its Green Paper: “Collateral 
is a vital part of the financial system as it underpins a large number of transactions in the 
market and provides a safety net in case there are problems” (2015, p.23). However, the 
Commission then fails to acknowledge the fact that the superior forms of collateral are safe, 
information-insensitive and liquid bonds, in other words, the bonds of credit-worthy 
governments. 
It can be taken as given that the authors of the Commission’s Green Paper are well aware of  
the importance of government bonds in the capital and money markets. It follows that the 
most plausible explanation for the omission of these considerations is political, namely, a 
reluctance to antagonise the government of what is today the most powerful continental 
European economy. While many governments view their outstanding bonds as nothing other 
than quantities of debt that have to be kept under tight control, none adheres to this viewpoint 
more religiously than does the German government. In its case certain interpretations of 
history together with the continuing weight of moral and cultural attitudes to indebtedness 
have produced a fear of issuing government bonds that is little short of pathological. The 
German government has always made it a priority to maintain a balanced budget over the 
economic cycle and when forced by circumstances to issue bonds above a given threshold it 
tries to get back below that threshold as quickly as possible. Just such a pattern was recently 
repeated after the financial crisis when the German government, forced to increase the 
volume of its debt to finance its various crisis-containing measures, almost immediately 
sought to reduce this volume through the incorporation of a budgetary correction mechanism 
or ‘debt brake’ into the German constitution in 20094.  
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Although the German government was not the first European government to incorporate a 
debt brake into its constitution (Switzerland, for example, had done so earlier) it was the first 
to do so in the European Union, a fact which is of crucial importance because it used 
Germany’s position as the most powerful EU economy to persuade as many as possible of the 
other EU member state governments to adopt similar debt brakes. Under the force of this 
persuasion, 25 out of the 27 EU national governments (those of the UK and the Czech 
Republic having opted out) signed the Fiscal Compact in March 2012, the major terms of 
which were that the structural budget deficit should not exceed 0.5% of GDP over the 
medium term and that this arrangement be anchored in the national constitution or on a 
comparable national legal basis. It was again German government pressure that led the 
European Commission to issue a document in June 2012 in which it agreed to coordinate and 
monitor the implementation of debt brakes in the countries that had signed up to the Fiscal 
Compact. Although the German authorities complained that the Commission’s document had 
several weaknesses (for example, it did not prescribe mandatory constitutional status for the 
budgetary correction mechanism)5, the fact remains that the Commission agreed to the 
proposal for a uniform 0.5% of GDP maximum ceiling on structural budget deficits and in so 
doing had committed itself to a policy that was in direct contradiction to its subsequent policy 
aimed at promoting European capital market development.  
In a sense the Commission’s 2012 stand on European debt brakes and its 2015 plan for 
European capital market expansion both appear to represent the same type of supply side 
measures intended to boost European economic growth in the wake of the financial crisis: the 
former because lower government debt burdens are expected to enhance the allocative 
efficiencies of market mechanisms6 and the latter because  a reduced cost of capital through 
the creation of a larger and deeper capital market is expected to encourage more job creating 
investments. However, the two initiatives are deeply contradictory as becomes clear as soon 
as the bond portfolio and collateral needs of the commercial banks and other large financial 
institutions are brought into the picture. On the one side, European capital market 
enlargement is conditional on increasing amounts of safe government bonds being made 
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development, there is no simple relationship between public debt and economic growth and no clear 
threshold above which public debt becomes a handicap (see Lysandrou, 2013). This was also shown 
by the exposure of multiple empirical errors in the work of Reinhart and Rogoff who postulated just 
such a threshold (see Herndon, Ash and Pollin, 2014).  
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available to these institutions, but on the other this condition is blocked by the imposition of 
debt brakes. The negative effects of this contradiction are serious but nowhere are they more 
so than in relation to German government bonds as we shall now see.      
 
3. Germany’s debt brake policy and the European capital markets 
The project of a Capital Market Union is emphatically intended to cover all member states 
and thus attempts to use the relative dynamism of the UK economy and the sophistication of 
London’s financial sector to reinforce the financial integration process.7 However, this does 
not alter the fact that sterling will never be more than a secondary currency in EU finance. All 
of the large continental European economies are in the Eurozone. It thus follows that an 
enlarged European capital market entails an enlarged Eurozone capital market, which must in 
turn entail a corresponding supply of euro denominated government bonds for the reasons 
specified above. In theory, there are a number of ways in which this condition can be met. 
The first is for a central Eurozone institution to issue bonds that carry essentially the same 
‘sovereign’ characteristics as do US treasuries or UK gilts. The problem is that this is not a 
feasible option as it runs counter to the very structure of the Eurozone. This is because its 
central bank cannot be relied on to give unlimited support to government bond prices, as is 
normally the case for national governments strong enough to borrow in their own currencies. 
On the contrary, the mandate of the ECB explicitly excludes such purchases. In the terms 
used by Aglietta (2014), the eurozone is not defended by a sovereign power while the states 
within it do not have access to central bank support and the monetary union is in consequence 
“incomplete”. 
A second possible solution to the eurozone sovereign bond problem would be for the bonds 
of the eurozone member states to be regarded in the capital markets as substitutable securities 
carrying more or less the same safety and liquidity characteristics. Following the 
establishment of the euro it seemed for a while that this solution could actually work in 
practice as indicated by the convergence in government bond yields towards that on the 
German Bund, see figure 1. The elimination of currency risk, the strong growth performance 
of the eurozone economies and the ensuing confidence in the stability of the eurozone as a 
whole all combined to induce investors to ignore the persisting structural and institutional 
differences between the eurozone countries and hence also the corresponding differences in 
                                                     
7
  The Bank of England gave a strong welcome to the Green Paper (Bank of England, 2015; Anderson 
et al., 2015). 
7 
sovereign credit risk. However, these differences could no longer be ignored once the effects 
of the 2007-8 financial crisis started to take their toll on the eurozone economies and on the 
finances of the eurozone governments. On the contrary, the issue of sovereign credit risk 
suddenly became the major source of concern for investors as attested by the sharp 
divergence in eurozone government yields after 2008. Tober (2016), in a paper whose 
argument converges with our own, emphasises the advantages of fiscal coordination in the 
eurozone combined with reciprocal guarantees of all, or a substantial proportion of, the 
government debt issued by all member states. This would certainly resolve the shortage of 
safe euro-denominated assets. However it would conflict with the current policies which 
actively maintain differentiated risk premia on the bonds of different member states as a way 
of reinforcing fiscal discipline.   
Figure 1 
European government Bond Yields 
 
 
A third possibility is the creation of a new eurozone sovereign bond.  In November, 2011 the 
Commission presented a Green Paper in which it argued the economic case for the common 
issuance of sovereign bonds among the Eurozone member states.8 It believed that in the short 
term the introduction of joint government guaranteed eurobonds "could potentially quickly 
alleviate the current sovereign debt crisis, as the high-yield Member States could benefit from 
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the stronger creditworthiness of the low-yield Member States." (2011, p.2) As for the longer 
term, the Commission believed that a substantial issuance of eurobonds could make the 
whole Eurozone financial system more resilient to future adverse shocks and reinforce 
financial stability while at the same time strengthening the position of the euro as an 
international reserve currency thus fostering a more balanced global financial system. 
However, a number of the ‘low-yield Member States’ led by Germany strongly objected to 
the eurobond proposal. They were simply not prepared to help share the debt burden of 
governments that, in their opinion, had borrowed excessively and circumvented the Eurozone 
rules over many years. 
The final possible solution to the eurozone sovereign bond problem is for the government of 
the strongest eurozone economy to take upon itself the responsibility of acting as the bond 
supplier of last resort. This solution is also not workable although in this case the impediment 
has more to do with ideological dogma than any institutional or economic constraint. We are 
of course talking about the German government. There has never been in recent history any 
problem about the quality of Bunds as they were considered risk-free and information-
insensitive because the strength of the German economy was such that the state’s taxation 
powers alone were regarded as sufficient guarantee against default, even in the absence of 
central bank support. Neither is there a problem with the quality of Bunds today as shown by 
the fact that these alone amongst the larger eurozone government bonds continue to carry a 
triple A credit rating9. Rather, the main problem today is with the quantity of Bunds in 
circulation. It is true that in the wake of the financial crisis that quantity has increased 
appreciably, with the result that the German government debt to German GDP ratio currently 
stands at an unusually high level10. In the context of the current discussion, however, this is 
not the main point. Because German Bunds are the only triple A rated eurozone government 
securities and therefore the only ones that meet all of the safety and liquidity requirements 
needed by investors, the more relevant size statistic is the quantity of Bunds in relation to the 
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entire eurozone economy rather than just to the domestic German economy and on this 
criterion that quantity remains comparatively small11. 
Unfortunately, while euro capital market logic dictates that the German government should 
continue to increase its supplies of Bunds, the incorporation of a debt brake law into its 
constitution in 2009 declares its determination to reduce these supplies. There already exists a 
convincing critique if the debt brake in terms of its potential impact on aggregate income and 
expenditure; in the event of a serious recession the implied budgetary policies could become 
extremely procyclical (Paetz et al., 2016). The present argument adds a complementary 
critique of the debt brake’s impact on the financial system. Apart from its fear that unusually 
high levels of government debt could have detrimental domestic macroeconomic effects, 
another major motive behind its debt brake policy is the concern to set an example to other 
indebted European governments. As argued above, it was the German government that was 
the principal driving force behind the EU wide adoption of a Fiscal Compact in 2012, and 
this government obviously believed that it could hardly insist on the introduction of debt 
brakes in other countries if had not first introduced this policy at home.  The problem with 
this belief lies not only in the idea that debt brakes should be introduced in all countries 
regardless of any structural or institutional differences between them but also in the idea that 
there is a single government debt to GDP ratio at which the debt brake should be triggered 
(the essentially arbitrary limit of 60% which was a rule under the Stability Pact, although 
never consistently enforced by the Commission, was repeated and reinforced in the Fiscal 
Compact which requires its transposition into member state legislation). .). A uniform 
government debt rule presupposes the idea of debt independence: one must assume that one 
government’s debt threshold has no direct connection to that of any another government if 
one is to assert that there can be such a thing as a single, one size-fits-all threshold. However, 
this assumption of debt independence leaves out of the equation the portfolio needs of 
institutional investors. Once these are factored into the equation, the respective percentage 
sizes of government debt thresholds cannot be mutually independent but must, on the 
contrary, be mutually dependent in which case they can also be unequal. The logic is 
straightforward: if in any period of prolonged economic slowdown private corporations are 
unable to produce safe assets with a sufficient storage capacity to accommodate investor 
wealth, then national governments must make up for this shortfall by increasing their bond 
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supplies; it further follows that if one set of governments are constrained for whatever reason 
from contributing to bond supplies on the scale required by investors then the latter have no 
choice but to rely on another set of governments that can supply bonds on the required scale 
and, of course, the greater is the reliance on these governments the more is their debt 
threshold pushed above that which is the average for other governments12. Figures 2 and 3 
illustrate this alternative idea of debt interdependence. 
Figure 2 
Yield and debt/GDP ratios for 4 Eurozone countries 
 
 
Source: IMF (2011a); IMF (2011b) 
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Figure 3 
 
 
Source: Andritzky (2012) 
 
Figure 2 shows government bond yields and government debt to GDP ratios for four 
eurozone countries over a twenty period up to 2011. During the latter part of this period 
government debt to GDP ratios rose from an average of 50 per cent to an average of close to 
100 per cent. Now if the idea of debt independence and the concomitant idea of a one-size fits 
all debt threshold were valid, we should have seen all eurozone government bond yields rise 
uniformly in line with the rise in the debt to GDP ratios as investors perceived a threat of 
default and threatened exit accordingly. As can be seen in Figure 2 this did not happen. While 
there were positive correlations between yields and debt to GDP ratios for certain 
governments, notably those on the Eurozone periphery e.g Greece and Ireland, there was no 
similar correlation in the case of the governments of core eurozone economies e.g Germany 
and France: nominal yields on their bonds generally remained flat even while their debt levels 
also rose sharply. The primary reason for this, shown clearly in figure 3, is that the funds 
pulled out of the periphery eurozone government bonds by investors were channelled into the 
relatively safer core eurozone government bonds.   
An understanding of this debt interdependence makes it clearer why the composition of the 
investor base in the core eurozone government bond markets has an important bearing on the 
12 
proposed enlargement of the European capital market. The crux of the matter concerns the 
contribution that international investors can make to that project. The Commission itself 
recognises the potential importance of this contribution for, as its states in its Green Paper, 
“The size of the capital market ultimately depends on the flow of savings into capital market 
instruments. Thus, for capital markets to thrive, they need to attract institutional, retail and 
international investors” (2015, p.16). As can be seen in figure 4, the US and UK capital 
markets do attract a substantial flow of savings from international investors in that their non-
resident investors are from other currency jurisdictions. In the cases of Germany and France, 
by contrast, the non-resident investors in their government bond markets are primarily 
institutional investors based in other eurozone countries. To quote from a recent IMF paper 
on government bonds and their investors: “Despite the apparently very high share of non-
resident holdings in the euro area, on aggregate the euro area depends less on foreign buyers 
than the United Kingdom or the United States”. (Andritzky, 2012, p.8) 
Figure 4 
 
Source: Andritzky (2012) 
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Thus if institutional investors from outside of the eurozone are to be attracted in large 
numbers into the eurozone bond markets there needs to be an increased amount  of high grade 
eurozone government bonds made available to them which means in practice an increased 
amount of German Bunds. This entails either that the German government increases its 
supply of these securities or that the existing German and other Eurozone institutional holders 
of Bunds are encouraged to cut their holdings. Neither solution looks likely as things 
currently stand. The debt brake law in Germany means that the German government has 
voluntarily ceded any latitude over its bond supplies, while the continuing economic 
difficulties in the eurozone periphery mean that non-resident eurozone institutional investors 
are hardly likely to leave the safety of German Bunds. This leaves the amounts held by 
German banks and German insurance companies and pension funds. German banks will not 
reduce their holdings for regulatory and other reasons, but neither will there be much 
willingness on the part of the German institutional investors to reduce Bund holdings despite 
the mounting difficulties caused by the drop in Bund yields. 
These difficulties are widespread in that the dearth of high quality government bonds in the 
Eurozone and in the EU more widely are affecting institutional investors who need to provide 
a stable return for their retail customers but who face the dilemma of either accepting 
negative returns on the best securities or purchasing inferior assets which expose their 
customers to inappropriate levels of risk13. However, the most severe example of these 
problems is given by the German insurance sector. Insurance, including long-term savings 
schemes linked to life assurance, is particularly important in continental Europe as indicated 
by the fact that the assets held by EU insurance companies exceed those of their US 
counterparts, the only financial sector for which this is the case. In 2014, two Bundesbank 
economists, Kablau and Weiss published a paper in which they assessed the financial strength 
of German insurance companies. They found that in the base-line scenario, where bond yields 
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run the financial markets may become significantly more unstable.(p5)” 
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move back towards more normal levels as they are officially predicted to do, all is well 
provided that the companies refrain from paying dividends to shareholders. But they went on 
to argue that should interest rates continue to remain low, large numbers of German insurance 
companies would be forced into default. In a “mild” stress scenario, modelled on recent 
Japanese experience, twelve of the 85 life insurance companies analysed would violate the 
capital requirements specified in EU directives by 2023. In a stricter stress test, where it is 
much harder to acquire earning assets, 32 enterprises, more than a third, would default by 
2023.14  
 
4. Germany’s debt brake policy and the European money market 
Germany’s introduction of a debt brake law into its constitution in 2009 has had as severe an 
inhibiting effect on the short term money markets of the Eurozone as on its long term capital 
markets. To see this consider the nature and functions of the most important of all money 
market instruments, the repo. Repo is a type of securitised financing transaction: one party 
sells an asset to a counterparty at a given price and commits to repurchase the asset at the 
same price, plus an interest rate component, at a specified future date.  If the borrower of cash 
(the repo seller) defaults during the life of the repo, the cash lender (the repo buyer) can sell 
the asset to a third party to offset the loss; in other words, the asset acts as collateral and thus 
reduces the credit risk for the lender.  
In a recent publication on repos15, ICMA argues that this instrument is pivotal to the efficient 
functioning not only of the money markets but also of the entire financial system because of 
the wide range of its uses, the most notable of which are  
i. to provide an efficient source of money market funding: “by offering deposits secured 
against high quality assets, by diversifying the credit exposure of cash investors 
beyond the banking sector and by disintermediating traditional but less competitive 
financial channels, the repo market mobilises cheaper and deeper funding for financial 
intermediaries, which in turn lowers the cost of financial services to investors and 
issuers”; 
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ii.  to provide a secure home for liquid investment: “the capacity of repo, collateralised 
by liquid high quality securities, to mitigate risk is particularly valued by risk averse 
end-investors seeking a secure, liquid investment for temporary cash balances and 
working capital”; 
iii.   to broaden and stabilise the money market: “the collateralised nature of repo allows 
a wider array of borrowers and lenders into the wholesale money market than just 
commercial banks. The resulting breadth and diversification creates a deeper and 
more robust market, which facilitates liquidity management between financial 
intermediaries and reduces systemic risk”;  
iv.  to hedge primary debt issuance: “in the primary debt market, repo allows dealers to 
fund their bids at bond auctions and underwriting positions in syndicated bond issues 
at reasonable costs, thereby providing cheaper and less risky access to the capital 
markets for issuers”;  
v.  to ensure liquidity in the secondary debt market: “liquidity in the secondary market 
for securities depends upon primary dealers and other market makers being willing to 
quote selling and buying prices continuously to investors”  a willingness that in turn 
depends on the ability to use repos “to fill in any temporary gaps in inventory 
holdings or to hedge the risk on temporary accumulations of holdings”.     
Excessively liquid repo markets were admittedly one factor leading up to the global financial 
crisis (FSB, 2012; Gabor, 2012). However there is no doubt that these markets are absolutely 
central to the functioning of both bank-based and security-market based finance.  The 
Commission’s capital market Green Paper certainly recognises the importance of the repo as 
shown in the quotation above and which is worth repeating here: “Collateral is a vital part of 
the financial system as it underpins a large number of transactions in the market and provides 
a safety net in case there are problems”. Also worth repeating is the curious fact that while 
the Commission notes that the repo is a relatively safe credit transaction precisely because it 
relies on the use of collateral, it does not specify the type of assets that are best suited to serve 
as collateral. In reality, it is only highly rated government bonds that unambiguously fulfil 
this condition.  To draw again on ICMA’s statement on repos: “Ideally, collateral should be 
free of credit and liquidity risk. The market value of such perfect collateral would be certain 
and it would be easy to sell in the event of the default by the collateral-giver. The type of 
asset that comes closest to this paradigm, and is in fact the most commonly used type of 
collateral in the repo market, is a bond issued by a creditworthy central government”.  ICMA 
recognises that there are other less highly rated assets that can be used as collateral in repos, 
16 
which are called ‘credit repos’ and which include bonds issued by emerging market 
governments, large corporations and banks, but by far the predominant type of collateral is 
the triple A rated government security. In its most recent semi-annual survey of the European 
repo market16, ICMA estimates that this collateral class accounts for almost 80% of EU 
originated repo collateral. When other, less recognisable and more risky assets are deployed, 
there might no longer be an absolute shortage of collateral but shortage now takes the form of 
a corresponding problem of misallocation as the ability to assess the assets concerned is a 
specialised capacity, possessed fully only by some of the potential lenders in a repo operation 
(Anderson and Joeveer, 2014).   
The upshot of the above discussion is that the financial crisis has thrown up serious barriers 
to the Commission’s plan for an enlarged European capital market even as the persistent 
economic slowdown resulting from the crisis has made it all the more urgent that the 
Commission executes such a plan. Collateral shortage is central to this conundrum. The 
reason why the financial crisis has caused the shortage to become a particularly acute 
problem in that it has on the one side served to boost the demand for good quality collateral 
while it has at the same time served to undermine the supply of such collateral. The demand 
side of the problem boils down to the near total collapse of trust between the large 
commercial banks. As can be seen in figure 5, prior to the financial crisis in 2007-8 
unsecured inter-bank borrowing and lending transactions comprised a significant proportion 
of money market activity but after the crisis such transactions have fallen sharply as more of 
the major lenders of funds have sought to protect their loans with collateral. The supply side 
of the collateral shortage problem comes down to the renewed divergence in the credit ratings 
on the bonds issued by eurozone governments. While most of these governments received 
high ratings in the pre-crisis period of strong eurozone growth, because the elimination of 
currency risk contributed to the convergence of these ratings and the accompanying 
convergence in bond yields, the ratings again began to diverge significantly following the 
crisis as a consequence of the differential impact on the public finances of the eurozone 
member countries. 
 
Figure 5 
Average daily turnover in various money 
market segments (index: unsecured transaction volume in 2002 = 100) 
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  ICMA (2014) 
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Source: ECB(2011) 
 
Although the Commission’s capital market Green Paper draws attention to the collateral 
shortage problem, what is interesting is that it does so in a partial, unbalanced way: “The 
fluidity of collateral throughout the EU is currently restricted, preventing markets from 
operating efficiently. Since the financial crisis, the demand for collateral has increased, 
driven by market demand for more secured funding as well as new regulatory requirements, 
such as set out in the European market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) and Capital markets 
Regulation (CRR).”(2015, p.23)  While reference is here made to the post crisis increase in 
the demand for collateral, there is no reference at all to the decrease in the supply of collateral 
caused by the crisis. Given that the authors of the Green Paper can hardly have been unaware 
of the supply side dimension of the collateral shortage problem, particularly as this dimension 
has been well documented in several authoritative publications17, one can again only surmise 
that the reason for this omission is a reluctance to draw attention to the German government’s 
debt policy. Yet the fact remains that it is precisely this policy that is a major cause of 
                                                     
17
  Levels and Capel (2012), for example, give evidence that collateral is becoming 
scarce in the euro area. Andrew Hauser (2013), Head of the Bank of England’s sterling 
market division, has warned of the problems that can arise when there is a shortage of quality 
collateral at the very time that the post-crisis concern with stability in the repo market 
actually increases the importance of such collateral. As he argues, the repo market, at least in 
some respects, tends to function in a pro-cyclical way: the haircuts or discounts applied to 
collateral assets widen in times of stress while the range of acceptable assets narrows.  
German policy through the economic downturn powerfully reinforces these pro-cyclical 
effects. 
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collateral shortage at the present time.18 Since the German government is the only major 
continental European government that continues to have a triple A rating, this government 
should continue to increase its supply of these bonds at a rate commensurate with the increase 
in the investor demand for them if the problem of collateral shortage is to be avoided or, at 
the very least, contained. That this is not happening is clear from table 1. Rather than 
continually rising in the period since the financial crisis, the percentage share of Bunds in 
eurozone generated collateral has continuously fallen as their supply has failed to keep pace 
with the competing demands for them stemming from both the capital markets and the money 
markets.i       
  
 
Table 1 
Collateral Analysis for the Eurozone 
 June 2013 December 2013 June 2014 
Germany 21.9% 21.9% 19.1% 
Italy 8.2% 9.2% 10.6% 
France 11.7% 11.5% 10.9% 
Belgium 3.4% 3.0% 2.9% 
Spain 4.6% 5.2% 6.3% 
Other Eurozone 8.1% 7.2% 7.3% 
UK 12.0% 11.4% 10.6% 
DKK, SEK 2.9% 2.8% 2.8% 
International 
Financial institutions 
 
2.2% 
 
2.7% 
 
2.4% 
US 2.6% 2.8% 2.6% 
Accession countries 0.3% 0.4% 0.4% 
Japan 4.2% 4.6% 4.8% 
Other OECD 12.1% 10.3% 11.2% 
Other fixed income 5.6% 6.6% 8.0% 
equity 0.3% 0.3% 0.1% 
 
Source: ICMA (2014) 
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  The Green Paper, however, implicitly recognises the need for high quality government-issued bonds 
in its call for bond-financed infrastructure projects where, presumably, either EU institutions or some 
combination of member states would sponsor the underlying investment and guarantee service of the debts 
incurred. The Bank of England (2015) makes the same call. However, this attempt to finesse the 
Schuldenbremse seems highly likely to fail in the face of German opposition to EU-level borrowing.   
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There are two major negative effects of collateral shortage, only one of which is 
acknowledged in the Commission’s Green Paper. This is the ‘re-hypothecation’ of collateral, 
which, as formally defined by ICMA, is a practice whereby  “ a party who receives a pledge 
of collateral pledges the same collateral to a third party”. While the economisation of 
collateral represents a possible upside of the re-hypothecation process, its downside is the 
complexity of the operational procedures that are required for the efficient management of re-
hypothecated assets. The greater is the re-hypothecation chain, the greater are the 
complexities of the operational procedures and the greater therefore are the risks of their 
possible breakdown. The Commission recognises this point, for as it states in its Green Paper 
“With demand for collateral rising, there are risks that the same securities are being re-used to 
support multiple transactions as was the case pre crisis” (2015, p.23).  However, what the 
Commission does not appear to recognise is the fact that re-hypothecation usually occurs not 
because of a shortage of collateral in general so much as of a shortage of high quality 
collateral in particular: this is because the efficiency of re-hypothecation depends on the 
market for the collateral asset being as deep and liquid as possible and this condition is only 
fully met by the market for high rated government bonds. Were the Commission to take this 
fact into consideration it would have to conclude that the best way of avoiding the risks of 
excessive re-hypothecation is to ensure that the European money markets are continually 
supplied with adequate amounts of good quality government bonds and what this means in 
practice, given the current realities, is an adequate supply of German government bonds. 
A second major consequence of a collateral shortage, not referenced by the Commission, 
concerns the negative impact on the conduct of monetary policy. In addition to the private-
sector functions of the repo listed above the repo market greatly facilitates central bank 
operations in the modern era. To again quote ICMA: “ The repo market provides a ready-
made collateral management framework without which central banks would not be able to 
implement monetary policy so efficiently under normal market conditions and act as lenders 
of last resort so swiftly in periods of market turbulence. Central bank repo feeds seamlessly 
into the commercial repo market”. Now a key condition for central bank repo to feed 
“seamlessly” into the commercial repo market is that the assets used as collateral in both the 
public and private segments of the repo markets are denominated in the same currency. This 
condition is more or less met in the US where in addition to Treasury securities virtually the 
rest of the US repo market relies on the use of  government guaranteed Agency debt and 
Agency Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS).  By contrast, this condition is not met in the 
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Eurozone repo market where US dollars figure prominently as one of the assets used as 
collateral.  
We are here talking of the FX swap, a currency instrument that now accounts for nearly one 
half of the near $6 trillion daily turnover on the global FX markets. A FX swap is a closed 
transaction between two counterparties that combines a spot transaction e,g the sale of dollars 
for euros with an outright forward transaction in the reverse direction i.e the sale of the euros 
for dollars.   Although FX swaps are generally used for currency related reasons (e.g the 
borrowing or lending of a foreign currency) or exchange rate related reasons (e.g rolling over 
a hedged or speculative position on exchange rate fluctuations), a substantial proportion are 
used as a repo type instrument with the difference that it is a key currency rather than a 
government bond that acts as the collateral19. Although FX swaps are used in this purely 
money market function in every major currency jurisdiction, this use is most pronounced in 
the Eurozone. An indication of the extent to which Eurozone commercial banks rely on FX 
swaps less for currency-related transactions than for repo-type borrowings is the unusually 
high ratio of inter-dealer (essentially inter-bank) FX transactions in the Eurozone: 64 per cent 
(67 per cent for FX swaps) as compared with a rest-of-the-world average of 39 per cent 
(ECB, 2010). This reliance on dollar-denominated collateral is a further, relatively neglected, 
aspect of the increasing dependence of European financial corporations on the US capital 
markets, a trend which would eventually make the construction of a European capital market 
at worst impossible, at best irrelevant20.  
In general, weakness in the repo market threatens directly to impair the contribution to 
recovery and growth from the proposed capital markets union. The taking of collateral, by 
banks and other financial corporations, is essentially a risk-management device. If use of this 
device becomes more difficult or more costly, it is likely that financial institutions will 
respond by reducing the risks of their activities. But if they draw in their horns in this way, 
the stimulus to investment and growth which the Commission hopes to achieve from capital 
market integration will be blunted or nullified (Anderson and Joeveer, 2014).     
From all that has been said here about the importance of collateral it follows that the 
Commission poses the wrong question when it asks in its Green Paper “whether work should 
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  For more detailed discussion of this point see Grahl and Lysandrou (2003) 
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  Grahl and Lysandrou (2014)  have stressed this same point in the context of the European 
Commission’s proposal for a European Financial Transactions Tax 
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be undertaken to facilitate an appropriately regulated flow of collateral through the EU” 
(2015, p.23). Such work must of course be undertaken if the Commission’s plan for an 
enlarged European capital market union is to succeed. Rather, the more pertinent question is 
what work should be done to facilitate the flow of collateral in the EU. By now it should be 
obvious that the first place to begin this work is in Germany with the first priority being to 
convince the German government either to reverse its debt brake policy or to accept the 
fundamental change that could establish a European-level institution as a major issuer of high 
quality paper.  
 
Dramatic evidence of serious malfunctions in eurozone money markets is provided by the 
astonishing disruption of euro-denominated repo markets at the end of December 2016. Such 
was the shortage of good collateral that interest rates on repo loans went to -6% (completely 
losing touch with the very slightly negative rates paid on deposits by the ECB). There were 
clearly specific factors to do with regulatory and accounting rules which helped to provoke 
this disruption. But the failure of repo rates to return to normal indicates that there is a 
continuing “shortage of readily available high quality liquid assets.” ICMA analysis (Hill, 
2017) points out that quantitative easing (QE) by the ECB has exacerbated this shortage – 
one aspect of QE as practised by the ECB is that bonds have to be purchased in proportion to 
the economic weight of the member state economies, so that the underlying shortage of 
German collateral in particular is aggravated. 
 
Caballero et al. (2017) characterise the general consequences of an inadequate supply of safe 
assets as “a modern version of the paradox of thrift: faced with elevated safe real rates 
(relative to their equilibrium level), households prefer to save and postpone consumption; 
simultaneously, faced with low demand and elevated risk premia, firms prefer to postpone 
investment. Aggregate demand suffers and a recession ensues.” In addition they point to 
impacts on international economic relations which seem to correspond closely to experience 
in the eurozone. There is firstly a flow of capital to economies issuing safe assets – in 
particular the US. This effect is confirmed by the increasing attractiveness of dollar as against 
euro credit markets for borrowers around the world, as recognised in the ECB’s latest report 
(2017) on the international use of the euro. Secondly there are tensions within the eurozone 
since all the benefits of bond issuance by the German government cannot be internalised 
within Germany itself but act as a public good for the monetary union as a whole.    
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6. Conclusion21 
The European Commission is correct in thinking that the creation of an enlarged European 
capital market by 2019 depends on overcoming the various obstacles that have thus far kept 
European capital markets fragmented and underdeveloped. But it is incorrect in its 
assumption that the only substantive obstacles in question are those to do with regulatory and 
legal barriers and institutional shortcomings. This is not the case. Even if the Commission’s 
action plan for capital market union succeeded in eliminating all of these particular obstacles 
effective integration might not result. A necessary condition is that the Commission also 
confronts a formidable political obstacle, which is the German government’s stance on debt. 
Unless and until that stance is changed the European government bond markets will remain 
comparatively undeveloped as will, therefore, the whole European private capital market 
sector. The Commission’s project expresses its increasing anxiety about economic recovery 
in the context of general, severe and continuing fiscal consolidation. The critique of that 
consolidation drive, linked to the introduction of debt brakes, is well known. However, a 
parallel critique can be made of the consequences of the same debt brakes in the financial 
sphere and this strongly suggests that no escape from the economic slowdown is at present to 
be found in more dynamic capital markets since these are impaired by the same restrictive 
policies.22  
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